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RECENSIONS 
avoir souligné la part d'instabilité associée à cette idée, l'auteur se met à nouveau à la recherche 
d'une instance de stabilité. C'est autour du thème de l'« incarnation plurielle» de Dieu qu'il la 
trouve. «Ce n'est que dans les interférences parai lactiques des perspectives locales et dans la 
polyphonie babélienne des discours fragmentaires que la voix ou l'image de dieu peut aujourd'hui 
se faire apercevoir, s'incarnant dans le pluriel » (p. 219). 
La question de Dieu amène naturellement O'Leary à aborder le problème christologique (chapitre 
VII). Il s'agit de concevoir une christologie en termes pluralistes et relativistes, qui permettrait de 
situer le Christ dans l'horizon interreligieux, sans pour autant trahir l'orthodoxie nicéenne et 
chalcedonienne. « Il nous faut trouver le chemin intermédiaire entre un attachement substantial iste 
aux langages mythiques et métaphysiques de la christologie traditionnelle et une dissolution déses-
pérante de ces langages » (p. 292). À cette fin, l'auteur propose de substituer la figure du « Christ 
vide» à celle du «Christ plénitude». Cette christologie, dont l'auteur nous fournit seulement 
l'ébauche, mériterait d'être développée bien davantage, mais il est tout de même permis d'en 
souligner l'originalité. 
On a déjà relevé ce qui nous est apparu comme l'aporie majeure de cet ouvrage : l'articulation 
inadéquate de l'instance discursive et de l'instance de vérité. L'auteur n'a manifestement pas réussi 
à dégager les implications inhérentes à l'inscription de la théologie dans le paradigme langagier. 
Une plus grande rigueur épistémologique l'aurait sans doute incité à contourner moins facilement 
certains obstacles se dressant devant lui. Si, pour retrouver sa pertinence, la théologie doit passer 
par Foucault ou par Derrida, comme O'Leary le pense (p. 13), elle doit assumer son choix jusqu'au 
bout et emprunter ces chemins inconnus qui s'ouvrent devant elle, dans l'espérance qu'ils mènent 
quelque part. À cet égard, l'ouvrage d'O'Leary, en raison même de son caractère exploratoire 
(p. 19), constitue un essai courageux et audacieux; il s'inscrit dans une démarche de recherche 
authentique. 
François NAULT 
Université ÏMval 
Louis DUPRÉ, Metaphysics and Culture. The Aquinas Lecture, 1994. Milwaukee, Marquette 
University Press, 1994. 
Dupré argues that culture is basic to reality, and thus influences the nature of things. Following 
Lévinas, he says it is culture which brings meaning to being (Cf. Emmanuel LÉVINAS, "Détermi-
nation philosophique de l'idée de culture", in Philosophie et culture, Actes du XVIIe Congrès 
Mondial de Philosophie, Montréal, Éditions du Beffroi, 1988, p. 73-82). Cultures and languages 
are essentially what make human beings human and therefore alter the nature of things and bring 
new kinds of things into being. Metaphysics must therefore treat culture as within the fold of its 
investigations, as belonging to an analysis of "ultimate" reality. 
It is Dupré's contention that the cultures which have developed in the modern world since the 
separation of theology and science have divided us, making contact between people extremely 
difficult. He says that at the beginning of modern era : "Being and knowledge came to be separated" 
(p. 2). "The metaphysical search for the ultimate ground became transformed into a quest for 
epistemic foundations. The mechanistic concept of causality of the seventeenth century annulled 
the traditional metaphysical question as meaningless : being meant no more than the sum of all 
beings" (p. 3). Nostalgia does not help : "A simple return to the metaphysics of the past never 
suffices for justifying the present" (p. 24). 
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But we have chosen forms of culture which divide rather than unite and we have lost faith in 
the overarching story of the unfolding of Spirit and its reunification in the Absolute. Even Hegel 
is read by Dupré mostly in terms of the understanding of spirit. "Cultural products that should 
assist the incarnate mind to find its way home out of the dispersion end up cluttering the road to 
their spiritual destination" (p. 21). According to Dupré, spirit is lost in the bric à brae of material, 
mundane, mass-communicated and dispensed "ordinary" cultural life. Modernity is seen as bending 
and breaking under the weight of its own cultural products : "[...] the more creative a society is, 
the more it risks to bury the mind under the sheer abundance of its cultural objects" (p. 21). 
Dupré puts the problem of cultural unity and metaphysics this way : "For the unity of meta-
physics to be possible, the culture in which it takes place must already have formed a coherent 
synthesis of its own. Its members need to agree on the most basic values and to share an overall 
vision of the real" (p. 42). Our problem, the problem of modernity is that, in the chaos of 
contingency, multiplicity and choice, when tradition has "lost its former authority" (p. 44), "the 
lack of such an integration deprives a metaphysical reflection on culture of its precondition" (p. 43). 
But perhaps we may find a way out through the study of language and the understanding of 
metaphor. Dupré recalls that "Western thought came to view language itself as revelatory and as 
transforming the entire visible but mute world of appearance into verbal metaphor. While finite 
realities possess their ground in the eternal Word, it is the human word that, by means of its 
unique metaphorical capacity, retraces their forms to this divine origin. Heidegger and Ricoeur 
have recently reminded us that without the ability to speak metaphorically there would be no way 
to refer visible appearance to invisible ground, and hence no metaphysics" (p. 5). 
The difficulty with Dupré's hopes for reunification is that it invokes a basic ambiguity. Emmanuel 
Lévinas, on whom Dupré hangs a central argument, has always been concerned to distinguish 
between totalities and infinities. Totalizing cultures that "thematize" and immerse everyone in the 
same cultural bath, produce totalitarianism, the disease which mass culture and mass communi-
cation have made central to our time. The infinity on which Lévinas draws is expressed in a 
passage in Descartes' Third Meditation in which infinity is described as that which transcends all 
attempts at totalization ; boundlessly infinite - infinitely out of mind - and beyond knowing. The 
infinities to which Lévinas refers can only be expressed through the richest possible plurality ; 
infinity itself is the overflowing superabundance of such a plurality. In the name of solidarity 
totalities repress and destroy the community they seek to solidify. The solution is to develop a 
social order which is open to all the modes of expression except those which repress pluralism. 
But one should be aware that there is a paradox to be overcome. While a fragmented "standpoint" 
culture sets men, women and cultural groups at each others' throats and creates gulfs and gaps 
across which no communication seems possible - especially the gap between technical knowledge 
and being - a culture built around a principle of unification threatens to become stifling and 
stultifying. Indeed, the dizzying deconstructions of post-modernity are spun out of a frenzied flight 
from Absolute Unity and Logocentrism. Freedom is freedom from the One, from religious into-
lerance and political tyranny. Dupré's plea for unity and Derrida's demand for endless deconstruction 
fall on the two sides of the paradox. Only if one can take Lévinas' infinity seriously does it seem 
that we could escape from the paralysis of paradox. 
Overcoming the paradox involves shifting and transforming prevailing definitions of both culture 
and metaphysics. Indeed, the portrait we philosophers paint of the "nature" of philosophy itself 
would seem to need revisions. The source of an uneasy ambivalence with regards to such a project 
are at the heart of the paradoxical nature of Dupré's lecture. Lévinas' "ethics as first philosophy" 
lies at the center of the dilemma : despite invoking Lévinas' treatment of culture as bringing 
meaning to being, where the logos activates and révélâtes the letter, Dupré's text ends with an 
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oblique critique of Levinas' philosophy of the in-finite. A.K. Min is quoted against Levinas' optics 
of infinition as supporting Dupré's plea for unity: "[...] it becomes [...] necessary to maintain 
totality as the ideal horizon of critical intelligence and liberating praxis" (p. 50). Despite the 
infinite's ability to emancipate being from existence, and thus open human reality to culture, Dupré 
persists in emphasizing the absolute need for unity, and thus, for totality. 
Dupré wants in some respects to follow and in others to reject Levinas' treatment of culture as 
the coming of meaning to being, or knowledge to existence. He writes that culture "holds out a 
spiritual surplus that urges humans beyond the satisfaction of immediate needs" (p. 14) while also 
maintaining that culture, above and beyond this impulsive creativity, is fundamentally a unified 
tradition. Dupré's desired unity calls for the meaning of culture to culminate in thematized 
coherency. He writes : "Undoubtedly the task of culture is to unite the objective to the subjective 
in a higher union. But modern culture rarely succeeds in fully harmonizing the individual mind 
with the transindividual expression" (p. 19). "Sooner or later," he tells us, "the cultured person 
feels [...] a captive of his own creations, enslaved to a constraining tradition. The mind's education 
occurs in a dialectic of moving outward and inward, but rarely does this process result in total 
success" (p. 19). 
Going from Hegel's ominous choice between alienation and objectification, it appears that Dupré 
favours objectification. Culture, according to Dupré, is by definition something that unifies. But 
our culture is unravelling, and the position of an "objective" observer has shattered to shards. 
Unity or totality is combatted by Lévinas for the sake of the other, for love and justice. But Dupré 
says our modern culture must be made coherent - and this for the sake of metaphysics. 
The crux of Dupré's problem is that culture, which used to provide a coherent base from which 
to begin metaphysical reflections, is not coherent. But the answer may be that what makes 
metaphysics possible is - as Lévinas and Descartes insist - that we constantly confront the in-
finite. Infinity can only be expressed through an infinite plurality. Seen thus, a limitless cultural 
pluralism which always recognizes "the other" without absorbing all otherness is the only morally 
acceptable unity. 
Suzie JOHNSTON, Leslie ARMOUR 
Université d'Ottawa 
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